The Veto Rights and the Intergovernmental Dimension of the EU Decision Making Process

Abstract

The European Union's decision-making process represents a unique institutional hybrid, combining supranational mechanisms with persistent intergovernmental dynamics. This paper examines the role of veto rights as a structural expression of state sovereignty within the EU's legislative and governance architecture, arguing that their retention in key policy domains fundamentally shapes the logic, pace, and outcomes of collective decision-making.

The paper further interrogates the tension between the efficiency imperative of qualified majority voting and the legitimacy claims underpinning intergovernmental bargaining. It contends that veto rights are not merely procedural relics but active political instruments through which member states negotiate the boundaries of integration. The conclusion assesses recent reform proposals aimed at extending qualified majority voting and reflects on the broader implications for the EU's capacity to act as a coherent political actor in an increasingly contested geopolitical environment.