Danubius International Conferences, 16th International Conference on European Integration - Realities and Perspectives
Management of Cyber - Espionage Intrusions
Last modified: 2021-04-21
Abstract
The soft side of Information War is called either Digital War or Cyber War, and gets larger use worldwide, due to the difficulty of proving the aggression culprit. The defensive posture of the Digital War, cybersecurity, is better developed, at least because everybody needs defense, while less global actors are hostile. However, while the focus is on protection against unexpected destructive actions, digital espionage keeps the victim system running, and benefits from concealed procedures meant to avoid security measures and continue the exploitation of network data.
In cyber-espionage, the target may be top secret data, which are strongly protected, but it may also be apparently unimportant customer data, information such as e-mail addresses, credentials, and other personal data. The latter kind usually gets less protection and can be later used not for strategic decisions, but for subsequent clandestine operations. Such information is perhaps of minimal importance for small businesses but becomes of national security relevance for nationwide governmental institutions and strategic infrastructure facilities, for example, nuclear storage sites. At that level, confidential data are better protected in local servers, but are available to scrutiny by maintenance software. Therefore, specialized software trusted specifically for system security and technological upgrade can be used by hostile actors for penetrating various wide area networks. Such gateway is the logistic chain of IT companies, whose software products become a force multiplier for cyber-espionage by state organizations or hackers at large. This is the case for the recent SolarWinds cyber-espionage operation, which provides useful insight on clandestine activities, and prompts to the need for improving cyber-security in view of espionage threat.
Beyond software solutions meant to strengthen digital system protection, the overall problem requires macro-system solutions leading to better resilience of national cyber-systems. Such requirement surely pushes national security institutions toward improving the organisational architecture of national cyber-security.